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Introduction 
 Adequate safeguards against health care fraud are essential to the proper 
functioning of any health care system.  This analysis examines health care fraud in the 
U.S., and its findings underscore the importance to national health reform of 
comprehensive anti-fraud protections covering both public and private health insurance 
industry. 
 This analysis examines health care fraud in a national policy context. Its findings 
underscore two critical points. First despite strong evidence that fraud is system-wide 
and affects the cost of health care in both public and private insurance, national 
reporting systems on health care fraud fail to capture private sector fraud.  As a result, 
current evidence on the scope of fraud fails to present the full magnitude of the problem, 
because it tends to focus on public insurance fraud. 
 Second, existing information on health care fraud tends to conflate evidence of 
fraud with evidence of payment errors.  While payment errors in public insurance 
programs pose a serious problem, the tools for remedying errors differ significantly from 
those used to address fraud.  
 Addressing these challenges in health reform is extremely important, not only 
because of the systemic nature of health care fraud but because, with rapid advances in 
health information technology, the potential for fraudulent schemes to move rapidly 
across all payers grows.  
       Following a brief overview, the analysis reviews the law and examines ongoing 
state and federal government efforts to combat fraud.  
Overview 
 
 As with any very large enterprise, the U.S. healthcare industry is susceptible to 
fraud and abuse in both private and public programs alike. Evidence drawn from fraud 
studies suggests that fraud generally tends to disproportionately target vulnerable 
populations such as the poor and the elderly. Furthermore, public programs operate 
under strict reporting requirements, thereby creating a situation in which the most 
commonly available information concerns public programs such as Medicaid and 
Medicare. Fraud can be committed by individual consumers and patients, but the most 
serious health care fraud is not the result of small schemes, but instead flows from 
large-scale misconduct by major industry actors, including insurers and health care 
providers and corporate suppliers. The vast majority of fraud prosecutions emanate 
from the health care industry itself; indeed, a feature of fraud prosecutions involving 
patients can be the exposure of criminal enterprises designed by corrupt health care 
providers who in turn induce patients into participating in fraudulent schemes. 
 
In 2007, the U.S. spent nearly $2.3 trillion on health care; that year public and 
private insurers processed more than four billion health insurance claims.1 The National 
Health Care Anti-Fraud Association (NHCAA) has estimated that conservatively, 3% of 
all health care spending—or $68 billion—is lost to health care fraud. Other estimates by 
government and law enforcement agencies place fraud-related losses as high as 10% 
of annual health care expenditures.2 At this rate, losses to fraud -- over $220 billion in 
2007 alone – would be enough to generously support coverage for all uninsured 
Americans.   
 
Fraud schemes are not specific to any geographic area and are found throughout 
the entire country.3 Certain types of fraudulent schemes (e.g., stealing patient ID 
numbers and falsely billing for care) tend to be more common. Also, it has been found 
that consumers are more susceptible to fraud if they are older and/or poor, thus health 
care fraud, much like mortgage fraud, would tend to be more common in poorer 
communities because of the greater vulnerability of their residents.4  
 
 Certain aspects of health care increase the risk of fraud.  Patients’ dependence 
on their health care providers may mean that unscrupulous providers can engage in 
activities that patients may not understand or to which they may acquiesce without a full 
appreciation of the consequences, such as having patients sign forms affirming that 
they in fact received care and services never furnished. The sheer volume of insurance 
transactions, coupled with their complexity, serves to increase system vulnerability to 
fraud.5  
 
Experts in the field of fraud suggest that health care fraud perpetrators consider 
their conduct to be a low-risk crime, with both public and private insurers offering easy 
targets. Insurers’ payment operations are geared toward rapidly processing massive 
amounts of claims, with a focus on coding, not fraud.6 Moreover, the commercial 
insurance industry itself, as revealed in a recent and widely publicized investigation by 
New York Attorney General Andrew Cuomo, has (not for the first time) used the 
complex nature of its own business to commit fraud, in this case by systematically 
                                                 
1 National Health Care Anti-Fraud Association. The Problem of Health Care Fraud. Consumer Alert. 
Available at: 
http://www.nhcaa.org/eweb/DynamicPage.aspx?webcode=anti_fraud_resource_centr&wpscode=ThePro
blemOfHCFraud. Accessed on October 15, 2009. 
2 Id. See also Federal Bureau of Investigation, (2008). Financial Crimes Report to the Public, Fiscal Year 
2007. Available at: http://www.fbi.gov/publications/financial/fcs_report2007/financial_crime_2007.htm  
3 Clarke M. “The Control of Insurance Fraud: A Comparative View,” The British Journal of Criminology, 
30(1) (Winter 1990), pp.1-33. 
4 Lee J., Soberon-Ferrer H. Consumer vulnerability to fraud: influencing factors. Journal of Consumer 
Affairs. 1997;31(1):70-89. 
5 Managed Healthcare Executive, (2004). Healthcare fraud and abuse remains a costly challenge.  
October 1. Available at: 
http://managedhealthcareexecutive.modernmedicine.com/mhe/Analysis+&+Indications/Healthcare-fraud-
and-abuse-remains--a-costly-chall/ArticleStandard/Article/detail/127451.  
6 Id. 
underpaying health insurance claims, thereby exposing patients (and providers) to 
sizable unreimbursed costs that should have been covered under their plan terms.7 
  
Even as they improve quality and efficiency, electronic data exchange and other 
technological advances can create further fraud exposure. This is because electronic 
claims transactions both increase the volume of claims and allow large enterprises to 
use technology to engage in fraud while avoiding computer fraud detection systems.8  
 
Numerous government agencies have found that no segment of the health care 
delivery system is immune from fraud, and9 government investigations have uncovered 
fraud in all industry sectors.10 Indeed, the failure to systematically and routinely 
measure the scope of fraud has been reported to be a characteristic of the insurance 
industry worldw 11ide.   
                                                
 
 The financial consequences of healthcare fraud are far-reaching. Whether the 
health care financing comes from an employer-sponsored plan, the individual market, or 
public insurance programs, the health care system as a whole bears the burden of 
fraud. Health care fraud translates into higher costs for insurers and consumers alike. 
Fraud also leads to reduced benefits or coverage as policies are tightened as a strategy 
to avoid fraud.12 Indeed, it has been reported that the overall rise of health care costs is 
in part due to fraud.13   
 
 Because Medicare and Medicaid are government-sponsored programs, efforts to 
reduce fraud tend to be more publicly visible, particularly since the federal government 
now issues regular reports across all healthcare sectors. But since 1995, 90% of all 
private insurers have launched anti-fraud campaigns.14 
 
 
7 See ¶16 of the Assurance of Discontinuance Under Executive Law §63(15) entered into between 
UnitedHealth Group and New York Attorney General at  
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/bureaus/health_care/HIT2/pdfs/United%20Health.pdf.  
8 Id. 
9 Health Care Fraud, (1995). Hearing before the Senate Select Comm. On Aging.” 104th Cong.,1st sess. 
(March 21) (prepared statement of FBI Director Louis J. Freeh).   
10 GAO, (1992). Health Insurance: Vulnerable Payers Lose Billions to Fraud and Abuse. (GAO-T-HRD-92-
29). May 7. Available at http://archive.gao.gov/t2pbat6/146578.pdf 
11 Clarke, supra note 3. 
12 National Health Care Anti-fraud Association, (2009). Fighting Health Care Fraud: An Integral Part of 
Health Care Reform. June.  Available at: 
http://www.nhcaa.org/eweb/docs/nhcaa/PDFs/Member%20Services/Fighting%20Health%20Care%20Fra
ud_NHCAAJune2009.pdf  
13 Id.  See also National Health Care Anti-fraud Association, supra note 1.  
14 Cohen EL, Cesta TG. Evolution of nursing case management in a changing health care system. In: 
Cohen EL, Cesta TG, eds. Nursing case management: from essentials to advanced practice applications, 
4th Ed. St. Louis, MO: Mosby; 2004:399. 
Fraud Defined 
 
In General 
 
Black’s Law Dictionary defines fraud as “a knowing misrepresentation of the truth 
or concealment of a material fact to induce another to act to his or her detriment.” 
Improper payments or overpayments may not involve fraud at all if a payment simply 
was made or claimed in error, unless an individual knew or should have known that the 
claim was erroneous. At its heart, the law equates fraud with an intent to conceal or 
deceive, an effort to generate unjust enrichment, or acting in a manner that conveys a 
reckless disregard for the truth of one’s claims.  
 
In the context of health insurance, fraud may manifest itself as deceiving a public 
or private health insurer into paying claims that are not owed or recklessly submitting 
claims. Insurers also, as noted, have been found to have engaged in fraud by 
conspiring to overcharge sponsors and plan members in relation to the benefits that 
were promised in their contracts. Both provider and insurer fraud are essentially an 
intentional manipulation of the claims payment process for financial gain through bribes, 
kickbacks, and racketeering. The essence of fraud is concealment, misrepresentation, 
mis-stating the truth, withholding information that would allow the truth to be known, or 
engaging in practices that will mislead others. A fraudulent representation need not be 
the sole inducement to act; the essential dimension is that without the representation, 
the injured party would not have acted.15  
 
 Fraud must be distinguished from improper payments under public programs, 
which must be publicly reported as a matter of federal law.16 An improper payment can 
arise from simple errors in documentation, coding, reporting, verification, and other 
technical matters related to the administration of public programs. Improper payments 
are reported annually by federal agencies under the Improper Payment Improvement 
Act of 2002 (IPIA).17 In recent years, as agencies increasingly have implemented the 
law, the amount of reported improper payments has risen. Along with better reporting 
have come efforts to correct the underlying program administration standards and 
procedures that give rise to improper payments.18  
 
Fraud is different because of the knowledge or reckless disregard for truth that is 
present.  Translating these concepts into examples in health care fraud reveals the 
types of practices about which much has been written: Fraud against the Medicare 
program happens when hospitals “upcode” their claims in order to get more payment 
than their care is worth. Fraud against private health insurers occurs when a physician 
files claims for phantom patients by buying lists of Social Security numbers. Fraud 
                                                 
15 Dobbs DB.  The Law of Torts. St. Paul, MN: West Group, 2000:1343-59. 
16 Call to Action Health Reform 2009.  Reforming America’s Health Care System: A Call to Action. Senate 
Finance Committee Chairman Max Baucus white paper.  Available at: 
http://finance.senate.gov/healthreform2009/finalwhitepaper.pdf  
17 P.L. 107-300 (107th Cong., 1st  sess.). 
18 Government Accountability Office (GAO). Improper Payments: Progress Made but Challenges Remain 
in Estimating and Reducing Improper Payments (GAO-09-628T), April 22 (2009). 
against health plan members happens when an insurer conceals information about what 
a service actually costs so that expenses are pushed back onto members or plan 
sponsors.  Fraud can also occur when a health benefits plan or insurer systematically 
denies or delays certain types of claims or rescinds insurance coverage once claims 
begin to come in. 
  
In each case, the perpetrators of the fraud are using their superior information – 
about the procedures furnished, the patients served, or the true cost of care – to enrich 
themselves to the detriment of others. For this reason, insurers and health care 
providers alike have been sued using a variety of legal theories, ranging from the 
violation of the common law of good faith and fair dealing19 to general or health care 
specific fraud statutes addressing false claims, the most common type of health care 
fraud.20   
 
The Law of Fraud 
 
Common Law Fraud 
 
As noted, the common law (the body of judge-made law that forms the 
foundation of the American legal system) classifies as fraud knowingly or recklessly 
making false representations or concealing the truth.21 Liability for fraud depends on 
proof that the person committing the fraud knowingly or recklessly has made a 
materially false representation with the intent of creating reliance and causing financial 
injury.22 
  
Federal Fraud Laws 
 
A significant body of federal law to address fraud has developed over the past 25 
years; a brief overview of such laws is provided here.  
 
 Federal False Claims Act (FCA). The FCA imposes liability on a person who 
knowingly submits a false claim to obtain federal funds. The United States can 
prosecute violators for $5000 to $10,000 per false claim as well as treble damages 
(three times the government’s loss).23  
 
In addition to applying to claims submitted with fraudulent intent24, the FCA also 
applies to claims submitted with “reckless disregard”25 or “deliberate ignorance”26 of 
                                                 
19 See, e.g., Wohlers v.  Bartgis  969 P. 2d 949 (1999); Bass v. California Life Ins Co and Variable 
Protection Administrators, Inc. (1991), 581 So. 2d 1087; 1991 Miss. LEXIS 352; Niver v. Travelers Indem. 
Co. of Illinois, 412 F. Supp. 2d 966, 968-72 (N.D. Iowa 2006). 
20 United States ex rel. Bledsoe v. Cmty. Health Sys., (6th Cir. 2007) 501 F.3d 493; 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 
21260. People v. Orzame, No. 194566, 224 Mich. App. 551; 570 N.W.2d 118; 1997 Mich. App. LEXIS 
254(1997).  
21 Derry v. Peek (1889) 14 App Cas 337 at 374. 
22 Tice v. Tice, 672 P.2d 1168, 1171 (Okl.1983). 
23 False Claims Act, 31 USC § 3729(a) (2009). 
24 False Claims Act, 31 USC § 3729(b)(1) (2009). 
their falsity. For example, a physician who bills for health care rendered to dozens of 
patients in a day – far beyond what a reasonable practice might entail -- is presumed 
under the law either to have intentionally filed false claims or to have ordered his 
untrained bookkeeper to submit the bills with total disregard for the accuracy of her 
work.27  
 
 In addition to allowing the United States to sue on its own behalf, the FCA 
permits private persons, referred to as "qui tam plaintiffs" or "relators"—or colloquially, 
"whistleblowers"—to sue on the government's behalf as well as their own.28 The Deficit 
Reduction Act of 2005 incentivized qui tam litigation by encouraging states to enact 
state false claims laws with qui tam provisions for use in Medicaid fraud suits. 29 States 
that enact such laws receive a bounty in the form of a 10% reduction in the amount 
owed by the state to the federal government in the event of a recovery. In order to 
qualify for this special statutory bounty, a state’s law must be a “qualifying” false claims 
law.30  
Legislation enacted in 2009, the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act (FERA),31 
further strengthened the FCA by broadening the range of conduct that can be subject to 
false claims prosecution by including the presentment of a false claim (even if not paid) 
and the knowing use of false records or statements “material to a false or fraudulent 
claim.”32 In addition, under FERA’s expanded definition of what constitutes a “claim,” 
the false invoice or statement no longer must be presented directly to the federal 
government in order to establish liability; it is sufficient merely if “the money or property 
is to be spent or used on the Government’s behalf or to advance a Government 
program or interest.”33  
 Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). RICO allows both 
criminal and civil prosecution if a “pattern” of criminal activity is found.34 A pattern 
consists of at least two related predicate acts (types of conduct that evidence fraud) that 
“amount to or pose a threat of continued criminal activity.”35 The predicate acts must 
affect interstate commerce and must be one of the 35 crimes listed in the statute.36 Mail 
and wire fraud (e.g., the electronic submission of fraudulent claims) are the most 
common alleged predicate acts.37 Under RICO, it is unlawful for any person who has 
                                                                                                                                                             
25 False Claims Act, 31 USC § 3729(b)(3) (2009). 
26 False Claims Act, 31 USC § 3729(b)(2) (2009). 
27 U.S. v. Krizek, 111 F.3d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 
28 False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b) (2009). 
29 Deficit Reduction Act. Pub. L. 109-171, §§ 6031-33 (2006) codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1396h(a). 
30  Id. 
31 Pub L No. 111-21, 123 Stat 1617(2009). 
32 Pub L No. 111-21 (2009), amending 31 U.S.C. §3729(c).  
33 Pub L No. 111-21 (2009), amending 31 U.S.C. §3729(a); Allison Engine Co., Inc. v. United States ex 
rel. Sanders, 128 S. Ct. 2123 (U.S. 2008).  
34 Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (2008). 
35 H. J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 239 (1989). 
36 RICO, 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (2008). 
37 Joseph GP. Civil RICO: A Definitive Guide. Chicago, Ill: Section of Litigation, American Bar Association, 
2nd ed. 2000;p 82. 
participated directly or indirectly in a pattern of racketeering to use any money derived 
from those activities to invest in, acquire, maintain control in, or participate in the 
conduct of an “enterprise.”38  
 
The Anti-Kickback Statute. Codified at §1128B of the Social Security Act, the law 
makes it a criminal offense to knowingly and willfully offer, pay, solicit, or receive any 
remuneration to induce or reward referrals of items or services reimbursable by a 
federal health care program.39 The definition of remuneration is broad and includes any 
kickback, bribe, or rebate.40 The statute is violated if remuneration is paid purposefully 
to induce or reward referrals of items or services payable by a federal health care 
program (e.g., if a hospital makes payments to a medical practice to incentivize referrals 
of its Medicare business). The statute itself has several exceptions41 and the 
Department of Health and Human Services has promulgated safe-harbor regulations 
shielding certain activities such as employment relationships, investment interests, 
certain referral services, and other types of payments that are not considered 
remuneration for the purpose of the Act.42 
 
 The Stark Statute. Often referred to by the name of the Representative who was 
its chief sponsor, the legislation, codified at §1877 of the Social Security Act, was 
enacted to “address the strain placed on Medicare Trust fund by the overutilization of 
certain medical services by physicians who, for their own financial gain rather than their 
patients' medical need, referred patients to entities in which the physicians held a 
financial interest.”43 The Act, which contains certain limitations and exceptions, prohibits 
physicians from referring patients to entities that furnish “designated health services" 
("DHS") in situations in which there exists a financial relationship between the entity and 
the physician or an immediate family member.44  
 
The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (“HIPAA”). HIPAA 
federalized the crime of health care fraud by making it illegal for anyone to knowingly 
and willfully defraud any health care benefit program (public or private) or to obtain by 
means of false representations any money or property of a health care benefit 
program45, make false or fictitious statements "in any matter involving a health care 
benefit program,”46 embezzle, convert, or steal any funds, property, or assets of a 
health care benefit program,47 or obstruct, delay, prevent, or mislead the investigation of 
federal health care offenses.48 HIPAA also requires the establishment of the Health 
                                                 
38 RICO, 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (2008). 
39 42 USC § 1320a-7b (2007). 
40 42 USC § 1320a-7b(b)(1) (2007). 
41 42 USC § 1320a-7b(b)(3) (2007). 
42 42 CFR 1001.952 (2009). 
43 Am. Lithotripsy Soc'y v. Thompson, 215 F. Supp. 2d 23, 26 (D. D.C. 2002). 
44 42 USC § 1395nn (2007). 
45 18 USC§ 1347 (2008). 
46 Id.  
47 18 USC § 669 (2004). 
48 18 USC § 1518 (2008). 
Care Fraud and Abuse Control Program, which coordinates federal, state, and local law 
enforcement programs to control fraud and abuse.49 
 
Federal Oversight and Administration of Health Care Anti-Fraud Efforts 
Although the Federal Bureau of Investigation is the primary investigatory agency 
involved in health care fraud, the successful resolution of anti-fraud efforts involves the 
combined investigative efforts and resources of the HHS Office of the Inspector General 
(OIG), Department of Justice (DOJ), Medicaid Fraud Control Units (MFCU), and other 
law enforcement agencies.  
OIG shares enforcement responsibility under the anti-kickback statute with the 
DOJ, which prosecutes criminal cases on behalf of the United States. OIG investigates 
allegations of illegal kickbacks and works with DOJ and the United States Attorneys to 
prosecute criminal cases. In addition, OIG supports DOJ's civil prosecutions under the 
False Claims Act. Under joint direction of the Attorney General and the Secretary of the 
Department of Health and Human Services, the national Health Care Fraud and Abuse 
Control Program (HCFAC) is designed to coordinate federal, state and local law 
enforcement activities with respect to health care fraud.50 The Centers for Medicare & 
Medicaid Services (CMS) is also engaged in combating Medicaid provider fraud, waste, 
and abuse through the Medicaid Integrity Program (MIP).51 
State Fraud Laws 
 
In addition to common law fraud and general fraud statutes, states have enacted 
specific laws aimed at health care fraud, which typically are part of the implementation 
of federal law.52 State fraud laws vary; some are of general application while others 
specifically target health insurance and Medicaid fraud. Fraud violations can result in 
concurrent or subsequent federal sanctions, and state sanctions can be more serious 
than their federal counterparts.53  
 
False Claims Acts 
 
 Prior to the federal False Claims Act (“FCA”) amendment, no state had a false 
claims act with qui tam provisions.54 Currently, 23 states and the District of Columbia 
have adopted qui tam statutes. (Table 1).55 Although modeled after the federal FCA, 
                                                 
49 42 U.S.C. 1320a-7c (2007). 
50 Department of Health and Human Services and The Department of Justice (2008). Health Care Fraud 
and Abuse Control Program Annual Report For FY 2007. November 2008. 
51 42 USC 1396u-6; See also Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services. Medicaid Integrity Program 
Overview. Available at: http://www.cms.hhs.gov/MedicaidIntegrityProgram/   
52 Fleps C.  Health Care Fraud & Abuse Compliance Manual. Aspen Publishers; 2002: Part 1 § 2. 
53 Id. 
54 Broderick CO. Qui Tam Provisions and the Public Interest: An Empirical Analysis, 107 Colum. L. Rev. 
949, 956: 2007. 
55 http://www.taf.org/statefca.htm  
state false claims acts show some state-to-state variation.56  Among states whose false 
claims acts contain qui tam provisions, 17 states and the District of Columbia 
incorporate these provisions into a general false claims law that does not solely target 
Medicaid. California was the first state to adopt a qui tam statute,57 and the California 
law resembles the federal FCA, imposing liability for, among other acts, knowingly 
presenting a false claim and conspiring to present a false claim.58 New York’s false 
claims act is also similar to the federal FCA; unlike the federal FCA, however, the New 
York law specifically excludes local governments as well as the state government from 
liability.59  
 
 The remaining five states whose laws contain qui tam provisions have enacted 
laws that are specific to the Medicaid program (see Table 1).60 The Texas false claims 
law includes prohibitions on knowingly or intentionally making false statements to obtain 
Medicaid benefits, failing or concealing facts that affect the right to Medicaid, and 
making false claims to Medicaid.61 Nine additional states have general false claims acts 
that do not contain qui tam provisions (Table 1). 
 
The Deficit Reduction Act (DRA) of 200562 incentivizes the state enactment of 
false claims laws by permitting states to retain up to 10% of amounts that otherwise 
would be repaid to the federal government in the event of a fraud recovery.63 This 
bounty provision works to incentivize states to “enact compliant false claims acts.”64 In 
order for a state to qualify for the FMAP recovery incentive, its false claims act must 
meet the following requirements: (1) the law must establish “liability to the State for false 
or fraudulent claims described in [the FCA] with respect to any expenditures related to 
State Medicaid plans described in §1903(a) of the Act”65; (2) the law must contain 
“provisions that are at least as effective in rewarding and facilitating qui tam actions for 
false or fraudulent claims as those described” in the FCA66; (3) the law must contain “a 
requirement for filing an action under seal for 60 days with review by the State Attorney 
General;”67 and (4) the law must contain “a civil penalty that is not less than the amount 
of the civil penalty authorized under” the FCA.68  
 
                                                 
56 Fleps, supra note 52 at Part 7 §5. 
57 Boese JT. Civil False Claims and Qui Tam Actions, 3rd ed.  Aspen Law & Business, New York, NY: 
2003: §6.01. 
58 Id. 
59 Id.. 
60 http://www.taf.org/statefca.htm  
61 Tex. Hum. Res. Code Ann. §§ 36.001-36.117. 
62 Pub L No. 109-171 §§6031-6033 (2005). 
63 Grady A. Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, Medicaid: The Federal Medical 
Assistance Percentage (FMAP) 2009, Available at: 
http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RL32950_20090202.pdf.  
64 48 N.H.B.J. 6, 11. 
65 42 USC § 1396h(b)(1) (2007). 
66 42 USC § 1396h(b)(2) (2007). 
67 42 USC § 1396h(b)(3) (2007). 
68 42 USC § 1396h(b)(4) (2007). 
The HHS Office of the Inspector General reviews state false claims laws to 
determine if the satisfy the FMAP reduction requirements.69 Currently, OIG has 
determined that 14 states have false claims acts that meet the DRA requirements 
(Table 1).70 Of the 10 states with the largest Medicaid populations,71 6 have enacted 
false claims acts meeting federal requirements. Florida’s law has not been deemed to 
meet federal standards, and 3 states (North Carolina, Ohio, and Pennsylvania) have 
failed to enact legislation.72 Figure 1.  
 
Figure 1. False Claims Act Laws Meeting Federal Requirements 
in the Ten Largest Medicaid States 
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Anti Kickback Laws 
 
 Thirty-seven states and the District of Columbia have anti-kickback laws (Table 
1).73 These laws are either general in application or Medicaid specific.74 State anti-
kickback laws are “typically applicable to all payers” while the “federal anti-kickback 
statute only applies to payments related to items and services provided under a federal 
health care program.”75 States’ anti-kickback statutes vary widely, are usually not 
modeled after the federal law, and often lack the intent requirements of the federal 
law.76 Medicaid-specific anti-kickback laws, by contrast, typically are modeled after 
federal law, although there can be variation, both among states and within a state, by 
service.77  State laws vary in the extent to which they include the types of safe harbor 
                                                 
69 42 USC § 1396h(b) (2007). 
70 State False Claim Act Reviews, http://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/falseclaimsact.asp  
71 California, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Michigan, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and 
Texas. 
72 http://www.taf.org/statefca.htm.  
73 Fabrikant R, Kalb PE, Hopson MD, Bucy PH (2002) Health care fraud: Enforcement and Compliance. 
New York: Law Journal Press; 2002; §2.03. 
74 Tully WB. BNA Fraud & Abuse Compliance Portfolio 1500: Federal Anti-Kickback Law. Bna Books; 
1996: § 8(C)(1). 
75 Steiner J. Health Law and Compliance Update, 2008 Edition § 5.02(c) (2008). 
76 Fabrikant, supra note 73. 
77 Fabrikant, supra note 73. 
provisions found in the federal statute.78 For example, the federal Anti-Kickback statute 
exempts remunerations paid by an employer to a bone fide employee;79 on the other 
hand, Florida’s anti-kickback statute does not.80 The relatively broad nature of many 
state anti-kickback laws makes state level enforcement a “much easier pursuit requiring 
less proof than would be needed to prove a violation of the federal statute.”81 However, 
at least one state court has held that a state anti-kickback law is preempted by federal 
anti-kickback law.82 
 
Self-Referral Laws 
 
 Often referred to as “mini-Stark” laws,83 thirty-four states have enacted laws 
restricting self-referral by health care providers (Table1).84  Laws vary by jurisdiction, 
but in general they fall into three main categories: 1) laws that are nearly identical to 
Stark laws applied to state programs; 2) laws that prohibit all self-referrals; and 3) laws 
with a disclosure requirement of financial interests to patients.85  In a number of cases, 
state  mini-Stark statutes simply incorporate the terms of the federal law by referenc 86e .   
 
In the case of state laws that ban all self-referrals (thereby establishing standards 
more stringent than the federal self-referral statute), physicians are banned from any 
ownership interest in hospitals or other facilities to which they refer their patients.87 
State statutes requiring only disclosure vary widely across the states, but most require 
disclosure in writing to the patient.88  
 
Whatever forms the state self-referral laws take, some state statutes may reach 
self-referrals not covered by the federal prohibition. Of particular interest, state law may 
extend to “referrals paid for by payors other than Medicare and Medicaid, referrals by 
practitioners other than physicians, and referrals for services other than those 
designated by the federal law.”89  In contrast, other state laws are more flexible than the 
Stark laws in providing broader exceptions to prohibitions on referrals.90 
 
State Oversight: Medicaid Fraud Control Units 
 
 State oversight of health care fraud has expanded considerably over the past two 
decades, spurred on by the fraud problem and by federal reforms.  
                                                 
78 Steiner, supra note 75. 
79 42 USC §1320a-7b(b)(3)(B). 
80 Fla. Stat. § 409.920(2)(e) (2000). 
81 Id. 
82 See State v. Harden, 938 So. 2d 480 (Fla. 2006). 
83 Steiner, supra note 75. 
84 Fabrikant, supra note 73.  
85 Bethard R. Physician Self-Referral: Beyond Stark II, 43 Brandeis L.J. 465, 474 (2005). 
86 Id. 
87 Id.  
88 Gosfield AG. Medicare and Medicaid Fraud and Abuse. §3.30; 2008 ed. Eagan (MN): Thompson/West; 
2008. 
89 Id. 
90 Id. 
 
The Medicaid and Medicare Anti-Fraud and Abuse Amendments of 197791 
provide 90% matching funds over a three-year time period to states that established 
Medicaid Fraud Abuse and Control Units (MFCUs) meeting certain requirements.92 The 
federal funding became permanent three years later, providing federal contributions of 
90% toward the establishment of a MFCU and 75% federal contributions thereafter.93 
The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 required each state to establish a 
MCFU or obtain a waiver from the federal government.94 Currently 49 states and the 
District of Columbia have MFCUs;95 only North Dakota operates without a MFCU and 
with a federal waiver.96 
 
 MFCUs are usually located within the office of the state Attorney General97 and 
have responsibility for both the detection and investigation of fraud and fraud 
prosecution oversight. In addition, the MFCUs oversee instances of nursing home 
abuse and fraud in program administration.98 The MCFUs investigate their cases based 
on local policies99 and bring the cases in state courts using state laws.100 Part of the 
National Association of Attorneys General, the National Association of Medicaid Fraud 
Control Units links the individual state MFCUs and seeks to “improve the quality of 
Medicaid fraud investigations and prosecutions.101 
  
                                                 
91 Medicaid and Medicare Anti-Fraud and Abuse Amendments of 1977, Pub L No. 95-142. 
92 Department of Health and Human Services Office of Inspector General (2003). State Medicaid Fraud 
Control Units Annual Report Fiscal Year 2003 1, available at 
http://oig.hhs.gov/publications/docs/mfcu/MCFU2003.pdf. . 
93 Id. 
94 Id. 
95 http://www.namfcu.net/states.  
96 http://www.namfcu.net/about-us/about-mfcu.  
97 Fleps, supra note 52 at Part 7 §2. 
98 Id. 
99 Id. 
100 Blank SM, Kaspisin JA, White AC. (2009). Health Care Fraud, Am. Crim. L. Rev. 2009; 46:701, 757. 
101 http://www.naag.org/medicaid_fraud.php. 
Table 1: State Fraud Laws (2009) 
 
State False Claims Act 
9 FCA with qui tam 
provisions 
+ Act applies to 
Medicaid Only 
*meets DRA 
requirements 
• FCA without qui tam 
Anti Kickback Laws Self-Referral Laws 
Alabama - 9 - 
Alaska - - - 
Arizona - 9 9 
Arkansas + 9 9 
California 9* 9 9 
Colorado • 9 - 
Connecticut - 9 9 
Delaware 9 9 - 
District of 
Columbia 
9 9 - 
Florida 9 9 9 
Georgia 9+* - 9 
Hawaii 9* - 9 
Idaho - - - 
Illinois 9 * 9 9 
Indiana 9* 9 - 
Iowa - - - 
Kansas • 9 9 
Kentucky - 9 9 
Louisiana 9+ 9 9 
Maine - - 9 
Maryland - - 9 
Massachusetts 9* 9 9 
Michigan 9+* 9 9 
Minnesota 9 - 9 
Mississippi - 9 - 
Missouri • 9 9 
Montana 9 9 9 
Nebraska • - - 
Nevada 9* 9 9 
New Hampshire 9 9 9 
New Jersey 9 9 9 
New Mexico 9 9 - 
New York 9* 9 9 
North Carolina • 9 9 
North Dakota - - - 
Ohio - 9 9 
Oklahoma 9 9 9 
Oregon • - - 
Pennsylvania - 9 9 
Rhode Island 9* 9 - 
South Carolina - 9 9 
South Dakota - 9 9 
State False Claims Act 
9 FCA with qui tam 
provisions 
+ Act applies to 
Medicaid Only 
*meets DRA 
requirements 
• FCA without qui tam 
Anti Kickback Laws Self-Referral Laws 
Tennessee 9* - 9 
Texas 9+* 9 - 
Utah • 9 9 
Vermont - - - 
Virginia 9* 9 9 
Washington • 9 9 
West Virginia - 9 9 
Wisconsin 9+* 9 9 
Wyoming - - - 
Total 239 
9 • 
6+ 
14* 
37 34 
Source: Information on State Fraud Laws was obtained by a web-based search of CCH Health, Human 
Resources, and Labor Database accessed July 29, 2009, and Fabrikant R, Kalb PE, Hopson MD, Bucy 
PH (2002) Health Care Fraud, supra  note 75 § 2.03. 
 
How Widespread is Health Care Fraud and What Forms Does it Take?  
  
 As noted, fraud is both widespread and frequently associated with the health 
care industry.  
 
Estimates are that 80% of healthcare fraud is committed by medical providers, 
10% by consumers, and the balance by others, such as insurers themselves and their 
employees.102  According to the National Health Care Anti-Fraud Association, the 
majority of healthcare fraud is committed by dishonest providers.103 The most common 
types of provider fraud are: 
 
• billing for services that were never rendered; billing for more expensive services 
or procedures than were actually provided or performed (“upcoding”);  
 
• performing medically unnecessary services solely for the purpose of generating 
insurance payments;  
 
• misrepresenting non-covered treatments as medically necessary;  
 
• falsifying a patient’s diagnosis to justify tests, surgeries or other procedures that 
aren’t medically necessary;  
                                                 
102 Coalition Against Insurance Fraud. Go Figure: fraud data. Available at 
www.insurancefraud.org/stats.htm.  Accessed on October 19, 2009. 
103 National Healthcare Anti-Fraud Association, supra note 1. 
 
• billing a patient more than the co-pay amount for services that were prepaid;  
 
• accepting kickbacks for patient referrals;  
 
• waiving patient co-pays or deductibles;  
 
• over-billing the insurance carrier or benefit plan;104 and 
 
• unbundling, that is, the practice of submitting bills in a fragmented fashion in 
order to maximize the reimbursement for various tests or procedures that are 
required to be billed together at a reduced cost.105 
  
 Table 2 presents an illustrative overview of the types of fraudulent conduct that 
have been pursued in court or reported in the press in recent years. These examples 
have been drawn from a systematic search of reported actions using legal search 
engines, as well as a review of legal journal and news articles on health care fraud-
related actions.  
 
The types of fraud recovery actions described in Table 2 might be pursued 
privately by health insurers as civil fraud cases, while, as noted, state Attorneys General 
or the United States Department of Justice also have wide-ranging powers under state 
and federal law to pursue health care fraud under numerous legal theories. 
  
Table 2. Examples of Health Care Fraud across the Health Care Industry: 
Private Health Insurance, Medicare, and Medicaid 
 
Private Health Insurance    Medicare    Medicaid  
 
Accused Company  Industry Type of Fraud Recovery 
(Year) 
UnitedHealth106 Managed Care  Underpaid consumers (10%-
28%) by manipulating 
database it used to pay 
customers for out-of-network 
services  
$350 million  
(2008) 
McKesson107 Pharmaceutical  Fraudulently inflated prices of 
approximately 450 drugs 
charged to insurers and 
consumers  
$350 million108  
(2009) 
                                                 
104 Id. 
105 Federal Bureau of Investigations.  Financial Crimes Report to the Public Fiscal Year 2007.  Available 
at: http://www.fbi.gov/publications/financial/fcs_report2007/financial_crime_2007.htm#health.  
106 American Medical Association v. United Healthcare Corp., 588 F.Supp.2d 432 (S.D.N.Y. 2008)  
107 New England Carpenters Health Benefits Fund, et al. v. First DataBank, Inc. and McKesson Corp., 
244 F.R.D. 79 (D. Mass. August 27, 2007) 
Accused Company  Industry Type of Fraud Recovery 
(Year) 
HealthNet109  Managed Care  ERISA and RICO violations 
by underpaying consumers in 
several states  
$215 million  
(2006) 
Cleveland Clinic110  Integrated Health Care 
System  
Medical identity theft; false 
claims  
Unknown  
Tenet111  Hospital  False claims, Kickbacks  $900 million  
(2003) 
TAP Pharmaceuticals112  Pharmaceutical  False claims, Conspiracy, 
kickbacks  
$ 559.5 million 
(2001)  
 
St. Barnabas Hospitals113  Hospital  False claims  $265 million  
(2006) 
HCA114  Hospital  False claims, kickbacks  $631 million  
(2003) 
HealthSouth115  Rehabilitative Medicine 
Services  
False claims  $325 million  
(2004) 
Ciena Healthcare 
Management, Inc.116  
Nursing Home  False claims from inadequate 
care in nutrition and 
hydration, the assessment 
and evaluation of needs, care 
planning and nursing 
interventions, medication 
management, fall prevention, 
and pressure ulcer care, 
including the prevention and 
treatment of wounds.  
$1.25 million117 
(2007) 
                                                                                                                                                             
108 This settlement is a preliminary court approved settlement entered on March 31, 2009 and the hearing 
on final approval is scheduled for July 23, 2009. Available at: 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aVpLVzpsq1NI. 
109 Wachtel v. Health Net; McCoy v. Health Net; and Scharfman v. Health Net, 239 F.R.D. 81 (D. N.J. 
December 6, 2006). 
110 Ronrad W. A New Ailment: Medical ID Theft, N.Y. Times, June 13, 2009.  
111 United States v. Tenet Healthcare Corp., C. A. No. 03-206 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 9, 2003).  
112United States ex rel. Durand v. TAP Pharmaceuticals, CA No. 00-12618-GAO (filed May 1996 in the 
E.D. Pa., later transferred to D. Mass, settled Sept. 28, 2001).   
113 United States ex rel. Monahan v. St. Barnabas Health Care System, Inc., C.A. No. 02-5702 (D.N.J. 
June 15, 2006). 
114 United States, ex. rel. Alderson, v. Columbia/HCA Corporation, Case No. 99-3290 (RCL), part of Case 
No. 01-MS-50 (RCL) (D. D.C. 2003). 
115 United States ex rel. James Devage v. HealthSouth Corporation, et al., Civ. Action No. SA-98-CA-
0372FB (W.D. Tex.).; United States ex rel. Manning v. HealthSouth Corporation, (W.D. Tex.); and United 
States ex rel. Brupbacher & Associates and Michael C. Freeman v. National Institutional Pharmacy 
Services, Inc. (D. N. Mex.) (cases settled Dec. 30 2004). 
116 U.S. ex rel. Denise Hubbard v. Ciena Healthcare Management, et al., CV-03-60175 (E.D. Mich.).  
117 This case involves fraud against both the Medicare and Medicaid programs.   
Accused Company  Industry Type of Fraud Recovery 
(Year) 
United Health Group and 
other insurers118 
Insurance  Fraud, misrepresentation, 
deception through use of 
company-owned Ingenix 
system to systematically 
undervalue its payment 
obligations for physician 
services in order to shift the 
cost of out-of-network 
coverage from the insurer to 
members and plan sponsors  
Approximately 
$100 million  
(2009) 
Amerigroup119 Insurance/Managed 
Care  
False claims involving the 
treatment of pregnant women 
and other patients  
$225 million  
(2007) 
Merck120 Pharmaceutical  False claims,  
Kickbacks  
$650 million  
(2006) 
Serono Group121 
AstraZenica 
Pharmaceuticals122  
Wyeth123 
Pharmaceutical  False claims, Kickbacks  $567 million  
$160 million  
Qui tam action 
pending  
(2000 & 2009) 
Bristol-Meyers 
Squibb124,KV 
Pharmaceuticals, Roxane 
Laboratories, Abbott 
Laboratories, Aventis 
Pharmaceutical, Teva 
Pharmaceuticals, Schering 
Plow/Warrick, Forest 
Laboratories, Baxter 
International, Dey 
Pharmaceuticals, Bayer 
Pharmaceuticals  
Pharmaceutical  False Claims  $123.75 million  
(2009) 
Omnicare, Inc.125  Pharmaceutical  False claims by replacing 
brand-name with generic 
drugs or switching dosage 
strengths  
$49.5 million  
(2006) 
                                                 
118 The American Medical Association v. United Healthcare Corporation, et al., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
45610 (S.D.N.Y May 7, 2009). 
119 United States, ex rel. Tyson, et al. v. Amerigroup Illinois, Inc., et al., 2007 WL 781729 (N.D.Ill. March 
13, 2007). 
120 State of Nevada ex rel. Steinke v. Merck & Company, Inc., 2006 WL 1506901(D. Nev. May 31, 2006). 
121 United States ex rel. Driscoll v. Serono Laboratories,, Inc., C.A. No. 00-11680 (D. Mass. August 17, 
2000). 
122Alabama v AstraZenica, [reported in] BNA, 18 Health Law Reporter (June 3, 2009).   
123 United States. ex. Rel. Kieff v Wyeth, C.A. No. 03-12366DPW (D. Mass); USDOJ intervention May 18, 
2009, [reported in] BNA Health Law Reporter 18:687 (June 3, 2009). 
124Alabama v Abbott Laboratories, No. CV-05-219 (Ala. Cir., Ct. May 22, 2009), [reported in] BNA Health 
Law Reporter 18: 685 BNA) (June 3, 2009).   
125United States et al., ex rel. Bernard Lisitza v. Omnicare, Inc., 01 C 7433, and United States et al., ex 
rel. David Kammerer v. Omnicare, Inc., 04 C 2074 (N.D. Il.).    
Accused Company  Industry Type of Fraud Recovery 
(Year) 
Johns Hopkins Bayview 
Medical Center126 
Hospital False Claims Act (qui tam)21 
by submitting false claims 
about patients conditions that 
had not been actually 
diagnosed or treated to 
Medicare, Medicaid, and 
TRICARE 
$2.75 million 
(2009) 
 Source: legal analysis of reported cases (Summer, 2009). 
 
Provider Fraud: The Most Common Fraud 
 
These cases suggest that the most common type of fraud involves systematically 
overcharging both private and public insurers for the cost of items and services for 
which payment is specified either by contract or in law. Thus, for example, many 
pharmaceutical companies have been pursued by Medicaid programs for failing to 
adhere to federal prescription drug rebate requirements, with resulting major 
overcharges to state agencies. (Because the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services have not yet reported on cases of either improper payment or fraud under the 
Medicare Part D program,127 it is not possible to know the magnitude of such practices 
under Medicare). Similarly, hospitals have been charged with systematically upcoding 
Medicare claims to falsely elevate the cost of care. These cases underscore the fact 
that these schemes depend on intimate knowledge of the health care business, the 
ability to manipulate complex data, and having an insider status that comes with being a 
health care provider. 128 The insurer fraud cases discussed below appear to be similarly 
dependent on complex knowledge and insider status.  
  
 A review of cases through legal engine searches as well as review of legal 
journals and news articles also suggests that the majority of fraud cases involve 
providers. Important 2009 cases show this pattern:  
 
• On July 10 2009, U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of Michigan Terrence 
Berg announced that Geoffrey Ramseur, a chiropractor who formerly practiced 
in the Detroit area, was sentenced to 20 months’ imprisonment on healthcare 
fraud charges, and ordered to pay $121,000 in restitution to Blue Cross Blue 
Shield of Michigan (BC/BS-MI).129 Ramseur pled guilty to submitting false 
claims to BC/BS-MI for fictitious chiropractic services that were never actually 
provided to patients. Ramseur admitted to engaging in this scheme over a two-
year period, and as part of that scheme, paying employees of Bing Steel and 
                                                 
126 United States, ex rel. Mayer v. Johns Hopkins Bayview Medical Center, D. Md., No. 1:07-cv-02011-
WDQ, (settlement announced 6/30/09). 
127GAO, Improper Payments: Progress Made, supra note 18.  
128 Dixon P. The World Privacy Forum Report (2006). Medical Identity Theft: The Information Crime that 
Can Kill You, Spring, p.36.  Available at http://www.worldprivacyforum.org/pdf/wpf_medicalidtheft2006.pdf 
129 United States Department of Justice, United States Attorney Eastern District of Michigan Press 
Release, July 10, 2009. Florida Resident Sentenced on Health Care Fraud Charges.  Available at: 
http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/mie/press/2009/2009-7-10_gramseur.pdf.  
other large factories in the Detroit area to use their Social Security numbers 
and BC/BS-MI identification numbers.130  
 
• Joby George, a pharmacist and part-owner of a pharmacy in Greenwich, 
Connecticut, pled guilty to knowingly submitting false claims to the Medicaid 
and Medicare programs over a two-year period.131 According to plea 
documents, George submitted various claims to Medicaid for prescription 
drugs that were not actually dispensed to Medicaid recipients, and also claims 
for certain brand name drugs when, in fact, he dispensed less expensive 
generic drugs. In addition, George admitted to submitting claims to Medicare 
for certain prescription narcotics that he dispensed to an individual while 
accepting cash payments from that individual for additional quantities of those 
drugs. George entered into a civil settlement with the federal government 
under which he agreed to pay $344,805 in restitution to the Medicare and 
Medicaid program.  
 
• Also in 2009, Sam Smith Hill III, a licensed psychologist who formerly practiced 
in Corpus Christi, Texas, was sentenced to five years’ probation and six 
months’ house arrest for defrauding the Medicaid program out of more than 
$48,000.132 During trial, the federal government showed that Hill billed 
Medicaid for psychological testing conducted by individuals with Master level 
degrees in psychology whom he hired to give the tests. In submitting claims to 
Medicaid, however, Hill falsely indicated that he had conducted the testing 
himself, and used the CPT billing procedure code for testing by licensed 
psychologists. At sentencing, Hill also was ordered to pay $48,739 in 
restitution to Medicaid and a $40,000 fine. 133 
 
• On July 14, 2009, New Jersey Attorney General Anne Milgram announced that 
Dr. Khashayar Salartash, a surgeon, his office manager Farah Iranipour 
Houtan, and the treatment center they owned were indicted on charges of 
defrauding the Medicare and Medicaid programs as well as various private 
insurance companies out of more than $8.5 million.134 According to the 
indictment, over a five-year period Salartash and Houtan, through their medical 
center specializing in the treatment of lymphedema, submitted false claims to 
                                                 
130 Id. 
131 United States Attorney’s Office District of Connecticut Press Release, July 10, 2009.  Pharmacist 
Pleads Guilty To Health Care Fraud, Agrees To Pay $344,085 To Settle False Claims Act Allegations.  
Available at: http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/ct/Press2009/20090710.html.   
132 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.  Stop Health Care Fraud, In the News.  Two Houston 
Area Doctors Charged in Conspiracy to Illegally Distribute Narcotics and Medicare/Medicaid Fraud (U.S. 
Attorney for the Southern District of Texas).  July 20, 2009.  Available at: 
http://www.hhs.gov/stopmedicarefraud/innews.html.  
133 Id. 
134 The State of New Jersey, Department of Law and Public Safety, Office of the Attorney General Press 
Release, July 14, 2009.  Atlantic County Surgeon, Manager, and Treatment Center charged in $8.5 
Million Fraud against Medicare, Medicaid and Private Insurers.  Available at: 
http://www.nj.gov/oag/newsreleases09/pr20090714b.html.  
Medicare, Medicaid, and private insurers that indicated Salartash had either 
personally provided services or directly supervised licensed personnel who 
rendered services, when in fact, the services were often performed by a 
physical therapist or nurse with no supervision. In addition, Salartash and 
Houtan allegedly billed for surgery when only physical therapy services were 
rendered, and for services performed in an outpatient hospital facility when the 
procedures were performed in a physician’s office.135  
 
• Six individuals—Alexander Levy, Zona Castellano, Aaron Bethea, Leonid 
Skylar, Yelena Bogatyrov, and Arthur Gutman, along with seven 
corporations—were indicted on charges of being involved in an elaborate fraud 
scheme that bilked the Medicaid program out of $47 million over a 10-year 
period, announced New York Attorney General Andrew M. Cuomo on July 
16.136 Levy, the ringleader, was excluded from participation in the Medicaid 
program in 1997 for submitting false claims for medically unnecessary and/or 
never provided services. Nonetheless, Levy set up a series of corporations 
structured to hide his control and ownership interests in a home healthcare 
agency, two ambulette companies, and three medical clinics, all of which billed 
Medicaid for millions of dollars of services.137  
 
There are unusual instances in which patients themselves appear to be part of 
the scheme, but by far the more common scenario involves the buying of patient 
information without patient knowledge.  
 
• On June 24, 2009, the United States Department of Justice indicted fifty-three 
people, including physicians, healthcare executives, medical assistants, and 
Medicare beneficiaries themselves for their alleged involvement in several 
schemes to submit more than $50 million in false Medicare claims.138 
According to the indictments, the defendants were charged with participated 
in schemes to submit claims to Medicare for phantom and unnecessary 
treatments, with Medicare beneficiaries accepting cash kickbacks in return for 
allowing providers to submit forms saying they had received the unnecessary 
and not provided treatments.139  
 
• In United States v. Ferrer, Southern District of Florida, On January 24, 2007, 
a federal jury convicted a defendant in a case involving the theft and transfer 
of Medicare patient information from the Cleveland Clinic in Weston, Florida. 
                                                 
135 Id. 
136 State of New York, Office of Attorney General Press Release, July 16, 2009.  Fraudulent Medicaid 
Provider Allegedly Developed an Elaborate Financial Web to Steal from Medicaid and Launder the 
Proceeds.  Available at: http://www.oag.state.ny.us/media_center/2009/july/july16c_09.html.  
137 Id. 
138 United States Department of Justice. Press Release #09-623 Wednesday June 24, 2009. Medicare 
Fraud Strike Force Operations Lead to Charges Against 53 Doctors, Health Care Executives and 
Beneficiaries for More Than $50 Million in Alleged False Billing in Detroit. Available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2009/June/09-ag-623.html 
139 Id. 
The defendant purchased the patient information from a co-defendant, a 
former Cleveland Clinic employee, who pled guilty on January 12, 2007 and 
testified against the defendant at trial. The theft resulted in the submission of 
more than $7 million in fraudulent Medicare claims, with approximately $2.5 
million paid to providers and suppliers.140 
 
• In California, unscrupulous medical providers were buying Medi-Cal and 
Medicare patient identity numbers and were using them to get reimbursed for 
millions of dollars in tests and other services that were never provided. Of $34 
billion annually spent by the Medi-Cal program for health care for 
approximately 7 million Californians, state officials estimate that as much as 
$14 billion in expenditures relate to similar fraudulent scenarios.141  
 
•   A 2009 GAO study reported fraudulent beneficiary conduct in relation to 
controlled substances.  In California, Illinois, New York, North Carolina, and 
Texas about 65,000 Medicaid beneficiaries (1% of the Medicaid population of 
these five states) acquired the same type of controlled substance from six or 
more different medical practitioners (known as doctor shopping) during fiscal 
years 2006-2007.  Some 400 beneficiaries were found to have visited 
between 21 to 112 medical practitioners to obtain the same controlled 
substances, a pattern that according to GAO implies drug addiction and 
fraudulent behavior.142 
 
Private Health Insurer Fraud: An Important Added Dimension 
 
Some of the most striking examples of fraud are those that involve the private 
health insurance industry itself. In these cases, the deception can involve either 
overstating the insurer’s costs in paying claims, or systematically and deceptively under-
valuing the amounts owed by the insurer to a health care provider under the terms of its 
contract. The result is to shift increased responsibility for the cost of care to the plan 
member and group sponsor, thereby avoiding the insurer’s obligations under the terms 
of its contract:  
 
• In 2009, UnitedHealth, a leading insurance company, paid $350 million to 
settle lawsuits brought by the American Medical Association and other 
physician groups for shortchanging consumers and physicians for medical 
services outside its preferred network.143 Under the United insurers’ health 
plans, members pay a higher premium for the right to use out-of-network 
                                                 
140 http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2007/April/07_opa_278.html.  
141 Testimony of Pam Dixon, Executive Director, World Privacy Forum. Electronic Health Records and the 
National Health Information Network: Patient Choice, Privacy, and Security in Digitized Environments 
Before The National Committee on Vital and Health Statistics (NCVHS) Subcommittee on Privacy and 
Confidentiality San Francisco, California. Tuesday, August 16, 2005. 
142 GAO. Medicaid: Fraud and Abuse Related to Controlled Substances Identified in Selected States. 
(GAO-09-957) (September 2009). 
143 The American Medical Association v. United Healthcare Corporation, et al., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
45610 (S.D.N.Y. May 7, 2009). 
doctors. In exchange, the insurers promise to cover up to 80% of either the 
doctor’s full bill or of the “reasonable and customary” rate depending upon 
which is cheaper. The Attorney General’s investigation found that by 
distorting the “reasonable and customary” rate, the United insurers were able 
to keep their reimbursements artificially low and force patients to absorb a 
higher share of the costs. This intentional manipulation of provider payments 
resulted in an estimated 10% to 28% increase in members’ direct financial 
exposure for the cost of out-of-network care.144  
 
• Humana and its affiliated private insurer was found to have intentionally 
misrepresented the size of its hospitals’ bills to employer-sponsored plan 
members, thereby causing members to pay amounts for their own care that 
vastly exceeded the 20% copays they legally owed. Humana secretly 
negotiated deep discounts with its own member hospitals. As a result, plan 
members were actually paying the majority of the hospital bills they incurred 
rather than the 20% copay they were promised.145 
 
Reported Cases in States with Large Medicaid Populations 
 
Table 3 represents similar patterns of health care fraud within the states with the 
ten largest Medicaid populations again showing that the majority of cases come from 
providers, not beneficiaries and are distributed among Medicaid, Medicare and private 
insurance markets alike. 
 
Table 3: Health Care Fraud among States with the  
Ten Largest Medicaid Populations* 
 
State Insurance 
Market 
Company Industry Type of Fraud Recovery 
(Year) 
Medicaid City of Angels Medical 
Center, Vice 
President146 
Hospital False claims, 
kickbacks 
$4.1 million 
(2009) 
California 
Medicare Blue Cross of 
California147 
Managed Care false claims $9.25 
million 
(2002) 
Medicaid WellCare148 Managed Cared False claims, 
conspiracy 
$80 million 
(2009) 
Florida 
Medicare University MRI & 
Diagnostic Imaging 
Centers149 
Radiology False claims, 
kickbacks 
$7 million 
(2008) 
Georgia Medicaid King 
Pharmaceuticals150 
Pharmaceutical False claims $3.5 million 
(2007) 
                                                 
144 Id. 
145 Humana Inc. v. Forsyth, 525 U.S. 299 (1999); 119 S. Ct. 710; 142 L. Ed. 2d 753. 
146 The fraud concerned both Medicaid and Medicare. 
http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/cac/pressroom/pr2009/007.html 
147 United States of America, ex rel. Vipul Vaid v. Blue Cross of California; Wellpoint Health Networks, Inc. 
148 United States v. WellCare Health Plans Inc. 
149 United States ex rel. David Clayman v. University MRI and Fred Steinberg. 
State Insurance 
Market 
Company Industry Type of Fraud Recovery 
(Year) 
Illinois Medicaid Condell Health 
Network151 
Hospital False claims $2.88 
million 
(2008) 
 Medicare Condell Health 
Network 
Hospital False Claims $33.12 
million 
(2008) 
Michigan Medicaid OmniCare152 Pharmaceutical False claims, 
racketeering 
$52.5 
million 
(2006) 
Medicaid HealthFirst153 Managed Care False claims, 
scheme to defraud, 
falsifying business 
records 
$35 million 
(2008) 
New York 
Medicare Staten Island 
University Hospital154 
Hospital False claims $25 
million155 
(2008) 
Medicaid Medicaid Dental 
Center156 
Dentist False claims by 
billing for medically 
unnecessary  
services  
$10 million 
(2008) 
North Carolina 
Private Blue Cross & Blue 
Shield of NC157 
Managed Care RICO $8.59 
million 
(2009) 
Medicaid Warrick 
Pharmaceuticals158 
Pharmaceutical fraud, unjust 
enrichment and 
violation of 
consumer 
protection laws 
$4.3 million 
(2009) 
Ohio 
Private United Health159 Managed Care Collusion in paying 
artificially low 
reimbursements to 
physicians 
$44.5 
million 
(2006) 
Medicaid Schering-Plough 
Corporation160 
Pharmaceutical False claims $7.8 million 
(2004) 
Pennsylvania 
Private Pennsylvania Blue 
Plan Highmark Inc. 161 
Managed Care RICO $10 million 
(2007) 
                                                                                                                                                             
150 Part of a nationwide settlement. U.S. ex rel. Bogart v. King Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 
151 Condell Health Network made a voluntary disclosure of its violations in order to avoid a FCA lawsuit.  
http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/iln/pr/chicago/2008/pr1201_01a.pdf.  
152 Michigan v. Specialized Pharmacy Services (Omnicare Inc.) 
153 http://www.oag.state.ny.us/media_center/2008/sep/sep3a_08.html.  
154 United States and New York State ex rel. Tirado v. Staten Island University Hospital. 
155 Part of a global settlement against the hospital for defrauding several government programs. 
156 United States v. Michael DeRose d/b/a Medicaid Dental Center. 
157 Part of a nationwide settlement. Rick Love, M.D., et al., v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield Association, et al. 
158 http://www.ag.state.oh.us/press/09/05/pr090528.asp. 
159 Aetna settle earlier for $22 million. Academy of Medicine of Cincinnati, et al. v. Aetna, et al.  
160 Part of a nationwide settlement.  United States v. Schering-Plough Corp. 
161 http://www.post-gazette.com/pg/07334/837893-28.stm System   
 
State Insurance 
Market 
Company Industry Type of Fraud Recovery 
Medicaid Abbott Labs162 Pharmaceutical False claims $28 million 
(2006) 
Texas 
Medicare Methodist Hospital, 
Houston163 
Hospital False claims $10 million 
(2009) 
Source: Legal cases found from health fraud search on LexisNexis. State Medicaid enrollment data found 
at Kaiser Family Foundation, http://www.statehealthfacts.org/comparemaptable.jsp?ind=198&cat=4. 
 
 
Anti-Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Efforts 
 
 Anti-fraud efforts have met with considerable success. The legislative expansion 
of anti-fraud law and its active enforcement have led to an increase in convictions and 
recoveries especially in the case of public health insurance programs, as well as to an 
increase in funding for implementation and creation of anti-fraud programs and task 
forces.  
 
 HIPAA established a potentially far-reaching Health Care Fraud and Abuse 
Control Program.164 The program, covering fraud and abuse in both publicly and 
privately sponsored health insurance, resulted in approximately $1.8 billion in judgments 
and settlements in FY 2007.165 The expansion of existing Medicaid anti-fraud activities 
under the Deficit Reduction Act also has resulted in improved Medicaid fraud 
recoveries.166  
 
 According to the Office of the Inspector General’s semiannual report to Congress 
(Spring 2009), the government’s enforcement efforts resulted in 222 criminal actions 
and 239 civil actions against individuals or entities engaged in health-care-related 
offenses.167 These efforts resulted in $1.6 billion in HHS recoveries, and $540.8 million 
in non-HHS investigative receivables, including civil and administrative settlements or 
civil judgments related to Medicare, Medicaid, and other federal, state, and private 
health care programs.168 The report also anticipates more than $2.4 billion in expected 
recoveries for the first half of 2009.169 
 Another important effort is the Health Care Fraud Prevention and Enforcement 
Action Team (HEAT) initiative, which is designed to reduce Medicare and Medicaid 
fraud. Since its inception in March 2007, with a first phase in South Florida and a 
second phase expansion in Los Angeles, the Strike Force has obtained indictments of 
                                                 
162 Texas ex rel. Ven-A-Care of the Florida Keys Inc. v. Abbott Labs. Inc. and Hospira Inc. 
163 United States v. Methodist Hospital, (S.D. Texas, 2009). 
164 Pub L No. 104-191 (104th Cong., 2d Sess.) 
165 Id. 
166 Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services. Medicaid Integrity Program Overview. Available at: 
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/MedicaidIntegrityProgram/  
167 Id. 
168 Id. 
169 Id. 
more than 250 individuals and organizations that collectively have billed the Medicare 
program for more than $600 million.170 In addition, HHS’s Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services, working in conjunction with the HHS-OIG, has taken additional steps 
to increase accountability and decrease the presence of fraudulent providers.  
 The Department of Justice secured $1.34 billion in settlements and judgments in 
the fiscal year ending Sept. 30, 2008, pursuing allegations of fraud against the federal 
government.171 Notably, this brings total recoveries since 1986, when Congress 
substantially strengthened the federal False Claims Act, to more than $21 billion. As in 
the last several years, health care accounted for the lion's share of fraud settlements 
and judgments, more than $1.1 billion.172 This number includes both qui tam claims as 
well as claims initiated by the United States. The Department of Health and Human 
Services achieved the largest recoveries, largely attributable to Medicare and Medicaid 
recoveries. In fiscal year 2008, state Medicaid Fraud Control Units recovered more than 
$1.3 billion and obtained 1,314 convictions.173 Recoveries were also made by the Office 
of Personnel Management which administers the Federal Employees Health Benefits 
Program, the Department of Defense for its TRICARE insurance program, the 
Department of Veterans Affairs and others.174 
 Table 4 shows the past decade of fraud recoveries. As the table indicates, 
Medicaid recoveries have increased as the laws have been toughened. As the impact of 
the 2006 and 2009 reforms are seen, and greater public policy attention to fraud grows, 
these recovery figures can be expected to increase still further. 
                                                 
170 Federal Bureau of Investigation Detroit, Department of Justice Press Release June 24, 2009.  
Medicare Fraud Strike Force Operations Lead to Charges Against 53 Doctors, Health Care Executives, 
and Beneficiaries for More Than $50 Million in Alleged False Billing in Detroit. Available at: 
http://detroit.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/pressrel09/de062409.htm  
171 United States Department of Justice Press Release #08-992, November 10, 2008. More Than $1 
Billion Recovered by Justice Department in Fraud and False Claims in Fiscal Year 2008.  Available at: 
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2008/November/08-civ-992.html. 
172 Id. 
173 Department of Health and Human Services Office of Inspector General, State Medicaid Fraud Control 
Units Annual Report Fiscal Year 2008. Available at: 
http://oig.hhs.gov/publications/docs/mfcu/mfcu_2008.pdf  
174 Id. 
Table 4. Federal Health Care Fraud and Abuse Program Recoveries by Fiscal 
Year.175 
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Source: Health Care Fraud and Abuse Control Program Reports from fiscal year 2000-07 available at 
http://www.oig.hhs.gov/publications/hcfac.asp. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 Fraud – whether committed by health care providers, plan members, or insurers 
themselves – is an unfortunate but real part of the health care landscape. Medicare and 
Medicaid may be susceptible to fraud in part because many investigative reports on 
victims of consumer swindles suggest that financial fraud is not uniformly distributed 
across all households; instead, it disproportionately targets the elderly, women, 
minorities, the less educated, and the poor.176 Furthermore, laws aimed at curbing fraud 
provide for extensive public reporting in the case of public insurance programs, a 
requirement that is not applicable to private insurers unless required to do so under 
state law.   
 
An extensive body of fraud law exists; nonetheless overcoming fraud will remain 
a key challenge. The importance of continuing to strengthen these laws is reflected in 
                                                 
175 The federal recoveries reflect the fiscal year the money was deposited into federal accounts for 
Medicare and Medicaid and not necessarily the year the claim was prosecuted or settled. 
176 Lee J, Soberon-Ferrer H., supra at note 4.  
the fact that both the House and Senate health reform legislation focus on the issue.  
Important ongoing efforts to reduce fraud include extending the reach and scope of the 
HIPAA insurance fraud provisions of 1996 and assuring transparent reporting across all 
forms of coverage, including public insurance, private health insurance, and employer 
sponsored health plans. In addition, while a focus on provider fraud remains crucial, 
evidence drawn from recent prosecutions and court decisions emphasizes the 
importance of focusing on insurer fraud as well, including marketing and enrollment 
fraud, fraudulent misrepresentation of the terms of coverage and payment, provider 
payment fraud, violation of consumer protection laws, and other forms of conduct that 
may allow insurers to amass and wrongfully manipulate billions of dollars in government 
and private premium payments.  Finally, sufficient funds must be allocated to federal 
and state oversight agencies in order to assure that cases of fraud are effectively 
detected and addressed. 
 
  
